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Metaphor, theory, and practice in 
the history of psychology 
DAVIDE. LEARY 
The chapters of this volume provide more than ample illustration of the 
claim that "metaphor permeates all discourse, ordinary and special" 
(Goodman, 1976, p. 80), and they also demonstrate that metaphor is 
particularly vital "at the growing edges of science" (Quine, 1979, p. 159). 
In these chapters we have seen that neuropsychological discourse has 
been advanced by the use of metaphors from telecommunications, control 
systems engineering, computer science, holography, and other develop-
ments in parallel distributed processing (Pribram, Chapter 2); that 
theoretical discussions of the emotions have revolved around metaphors 
of inner feelings, physiological responses, vestiges of animal nature, dis-
eases of the mind, driving forces, and social roles (Averill, Chapter 3); 
that treatments of motivation have portrayed the human person as a 
pawn, an agent, a natural entity, an organism, or a machine (McRey-
nolds, Chapter 4); that a vast array of ~ognitive metaphors have been 
insinuated into a variety of domains in psychology and related sciences, 
ranging from the metaphors of "vigilance" and "defense" in the field of 
perception through the "access skeletons" and "flavors" of artificial in-
telligence (Hoffman, Cochran, & Nead, Chapter 5); that separate tradi-
tions proposing "reproductive" versus "productive" theories of cognition 
have evolved from diverse views of consciousness as either a passive 
mirror of reality or an active molder of experience (Bruner & Feldman, 
Chapter 6); that there is a rich history of behaviorist metaphors, extend-
ing from Descartes's reflected spirits and Pavlov's psychic reflexes 
through Tolman's mazes, Hull's machines, and Skinner's selection by 
consequences (Smith, Chapter 7); that whereas traditional discussions of 
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social groups have typically utilized organismic, animalistic, and physica-
listic metaphors, recent social scientific discourse has tended to view 
social life from the metaphoric perspectives of the animal laboratory, 
mechanistic regulation, meaningful relations, and systems theory 
(Gergen, Chapter 8); that there is a long history of categorizing and 
reifying unwanted conduct through the use of "mental illness," "hyster-
ia," "schizophrenia," "hallucination," and other such loosely warranted 
metaphors (Sarbin, Chapter 9); and that an analysis of the historical roots 
of modern associationism, besides revealing the importance of cultural 
context in the articulation of basic psychological metaphors, suggests that 
a fuller understanding of the role of metaphor will involve a broader 
consideration of metaphor's place within psychological discourse as a 
whole (Danziger, Chapter 10). 
What may not have been so amply highlighted in the foregoing chap-
ters, simply by virtue of their preordinate emphasis on the role of 
metaphor in the construction of psychological theory, is the extent to 
which metaphors are associated with the practical routines of day-to-day 
behavior - with the "dramas," "rituals," and "performances" that fill the 
lives of psychologists and their public. 1 As psychologists learn through 
metaphorical comparisons to see certain "commonalities in objects or 
situations," they rather naturally come to behave in a similar fashion 
toward these objects or situations (see Gardner, 1982, p. 166). Thus, if 
some psychologists conceptualize the mind as a computational device 
whose instrumentalities and procedures can be specified once and for all, 
whereas others think of the mind as an organic entity that changes both 
structurally and functionally over the course of a lifetime, they will adopt 
very different methodological practices in their psychological investiga-
tions. Similarly, if clinical or counseling psychologists consider members 
of the public to be their "clients" rather than their "patients," they are 
likely to orient their professional interactions in distinctive ways. In other 
words, the metaphors psychologists use to construe the objects and sub-
jects of their concern are related - often in fundamental ways - to the 
methodological and social practices in which they engage.2 
The commerce between metaphor and practice, like that between 
theory and practice, can be conducted in both directions. Metaphors can 
be drawn from the realm of the practical just as practical routines can be 
derived from the metaphorical conceptions underlying theoretical dis-
course. Furthermore, just as practice can be shaped by metaphor, so too 
can the creative extension or amendment of metaphors be facilitated 
or constrained by various practical factors and considerations. 3 For this 
reason, metaphorical thinking, in science as elsewhere, can hardly be 
treated, in its fullness, as some sort of disembodied or radically free play 
of the mind, limited (if at all) only by the past experiences, cognitive 
habits, and biases of individuals. That such treatments are sometimes 
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proposed is sufficient cause for Knorr-Cetina's (1981, chap. 3) repeated 
insistence that metaphorical or analogical theories of scientific innovation 
are incomplete. It is certainly true, as she argues, that scientists must 
"work out" or "realize" metaphorical concepts in the tangible, nitty-
gritty process of "knowledge production" that takes place in the labora-
tory or clinic before any truly consequential innovations can be brought 
about. It is also true that the theoretical articulation of a metaphor often 
occurs closer to the end than to the beginning of the research process. 
Clearly, as Knorr-Cetina (1981) says, "the process of research production 
and reproduction is more complex than the equation of metaphor and 
innovation suggests" (p. 66).4 
Furthermore, in addition to the social norms, institutional structures, 
and practical routines that may seem more immediately indigenous to 
scientific workplaces, the context of the production and selective con-
sumption of research is composed of cultural values and constructs. As 
Durkheim (1912/1965) said long ago: 
It is not at all true that concepts, even when constructed according 
to the rules of science, get their authority uniquely from their 
objective value. It is not enough that they be true to be believed. If 
they are not in harmony with the other beliefs and opinions, or, in a 
word, with the mass of the other collective representations [the 
concepts taken for granted by most people in a given time and 
place], they will be denied; minds will be closed to them; conse-
quently it will be as though they did not exist. (p. 486) 
Investigating the social historical context as well as the social historical 
influence of any given metaphor will prove essential if we are to know not 
just that metaphors play an important role in the history of science, but 
why this or that particular metaphor plays this or that role at this or that 
time and in this or that place. In this regard, Kurt Danziger's call (in this 
volume) for careful attention to the sociocognitive or cultural setting of 
psychological theory and practice is very well justified. It is critical that 
we heed such calls if we are to carry the program of research initiated in 
this volume to its completion - or if we are, at the very least, to start 
down the path that future research must take. I would characterize this 
path by saying that it leads through the newly emerging field of the 
rhetoric of science toward an even wider concern with what might be 
called the pragmatics of science. 
To situate these new and prospective fields, with special reference to 
the history of psychology, I would begin by noting that the practice of 
psychology is clearly framed and supported by the kind of social and 
institutional structures studied by sociologists of science. Beyond that, it 
is held together by the finer webs of cultural, historical, linguistic, and 
personal relations that anthropologists, historians, psychologists, and 
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rhetoricians like to investigate. The subject matters of these various 
disciplines may be said to revolve around the problems and processes of 
community and communication. Science, as one of these subject matters, 
may seem to begin with the attempt to specify and clarify the products of 
perception, but as David Bohm (1977) has put it: 
the very act of perception is shaped and formed by the intention to 
communicate, as well as by a general awareness of what has been 
communicated in the past, by oneself and others. Even now, it is 
generally only in communication that we deeply understand, that is, 
perceive the whole meaning of, what has been observed. So there is 
no point in considering any kind of separation of perception and 
communication. (p. 374) 
A similar awareness of the social context of perception - and of all that 
follows after perception in the standard conceptualization of scientific 
"knowledge production" - has been at the root of the recent "rhetorical 
turn" in historical and pµilosophical studies of science. 5 The investigation 
of the role of metaphor in the history of science is both a cause and an 
effect of this turn, and it invites the next step into a full-blown rhetoric of 
science. 
To speak of the rhetoric of science is not to imply that science is some 
kind of mere word play, any more than speaking of metaphorical thinking 
in science commits one to such a view. To attend to the rhetoric of 
science is simply to acknowledge the potential significance of the fact that 
science - like all knowledge - is achieved through and by means of 
symbolic activity, especially linguistic activity. This linguistic activity in-
cludes the use of alternative sign systems (such as those composed of 
numbers) as well as the use of various distinctive means of argumentation 
and persuasion (such as standardized publication formats) that are in-
tended both to capture and to communicate a particular sort of "grasp" 
on reality. 6 
An understanding of the pragmatics of science - the all-inclusive set of 
tangible practices that constitute how science actually works - lies on the 
other side of, and will encompass, an understanding of the rhetoric of 
science. Since we are presently far from enjoying a complete understand-
ing of the latter, the pragmatics of science can be seen, for now, only as a 
heuristic goal toward which current and future research should aim. Still, 
it should prove useful to keep this goal in mind and to strive to reach it, 
all the more so because a complete understanding of the actual workings 
of science would be extraordinarily valuable. 
Why is this so? Why would an understanding of the pragmatics of 
science be so important? Because for better and worse, science, including 
psychology and its many professional offshoots, has been woven into 
the very fiber of our culture. It has become an essential source of our 
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culture's material goods, social practices, emotional comforts, and spiri-
tual values - as it has also become associated with many of our culture's 
significant tensions, material dangers, social inequities, emotional distres-
ses, and spiritual crises. 
If the metaphors of science can "make one feel at home," as Freud 
(1933/1964, p. 77) once put it, they can also serve - and have served - to 
dislocate humans from their once taken-for-granted position in the world. 
If we are to "figure out" not only the nature and history of science and 
psychology, but also the contours and relations of a future world that 
would be more worthy and supportive of habitation, our metaphors and 
their encompassing rhetoric must be carefully selected, thoughtfully 
crafted, and judiciously used. 
This volume marks only a beginning. Its individual chapters provide 
initial forays into largely uncharted territories, and they raise a number of 
issues that deserve further consideration.7 As first steps go, this volume 
seems to be a good, solid one. Nonetheless, it begs for a sequel, for 
additional steps toward an understanding of the role of metaphor in the 
theory and practice of psychology - and toward a future that we can only 
imagine at the present time. 
Notes 
1 These term - "dramas," "rituals," and "performances" - are drawn from the 
work of Victor Turner (1974) and James Fernandez (1986). For other discus-
sions of the "social use of metaphors" or the instantiation of metaphors in 
everyday life, see Sapir and Crocker (1977). For related discussions, see Edge 
(1974), Gouldner (1974), and Schon (1979). Some recognition was given to the 
practical import of psychological metaphors in Chapter 1 (e.g., in notes 52 and 
53) as well as in other chapters (e.g., Chapter 8, by Gergen; Chapter 9, by 
Sarbin; and Chapter 10, by Danziger), but much more remains to be said. 
2 Sarbin (Chapter 9) has pointed out the relation between the conceptual 
metaphors and therapeutic practices of behavioral therapists, psychodynarnic 
therapists, existential therapists, and social systems therapists. Besides implicit-
ly structuring the therapeutic situation, metaphors can also be used explicitly 
within the psychotherapeutic interchange, as the means by which both inner 
states and external problems can be identified, communicated, and resolved. 
See Barker (1985), Cox and Theilgaard (1987), Haley (1976), and Mills and 
Crowley (1986) for examples of such uses. For related discussions of 
"metaphors we live by" and "metaphors of living," see Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) and Mair (1977), respectively. Also see White (1987) for an analysis of 
the folk wisdom embodied in proverbs, which appear to be a "special case of 
the more general process of metaphorical understanding" (p. 153). At the other 
end of the spectrum, see Sontag (1978, 1988) for discussions of metaphors of 
disease and dying. Although she admits that there can be no thinking without 
metaphors, Sontag has castigated the use of the metaphors that have come to 
be associated with cancer and AIDS, precisely because of the devastating 
effects they have on the victims of these diseases - on their hopes and fears, 
their self-images, and the ways they are considered and treated by others. 
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Insofar as she is correct about these effects of metaphorical thinking (and it is 
only the degree and not the influence itself that seems to me to be at issue), her 
examples provide a poignant demonstration of the impact of metaphors on the 
practical conduct of day-to-day lives. An awareness of such practical impact 
should increase the perceived need for the "management of metaphor" 
(Simons, 1981). 
3 For instance, Danziger's treatment of associationism (Chapter 10, this volume) 
illustrates the reshaping of an old metaphor that can take place in a new 
cultural context. Similarly, Hoffman, Cochran, and Nead's essay (Chapter 5) is 
full of examples of conceptual and theoretical developments that had to await 
the creation of appropriate technological analogs. Indeed, each chapter in this 
volume offers examples that similarly reflect the influence of practical reality on 
theoretical formulation. 
4 On the social practices associated with the production of research, see Latour 
and Woolgar (1979) and Star (1983) as well as Knorr-Cetina (1981). Morawski 
(1988) has discussed the "social bases of psychologists' work." With regard to 
the broader social context of scientific work, Brannigan (1981), Csikszent-
mihalyi (1988), Gruber and Davis (1988), and Rosenberg (1976), among many 
others, have begun to clarify the social origins and environment of scientific 
innovation, and O'Donnell (1985) has mapped out some of the social dimen-
sions of the rise of American psychology around the tum of the century. The 
latter treatments of the encompassing social context are relevant to, but not 
equivalent to, the "closer" analyses of the social processes at work within the 
research environment to which I referred in the first sentence of this note. 
5 Rhetoric, of course, is the art or science of spoken or written discourse, of the 
use of figures of speech and grammatical forms in the composition and com-
munication of thought and feeling, of the effective use of speech and writing, 
with the particular aim to influence and persuade. The "rhetorical tum" in the 
study of science can be traced along one line to Toulmin's (1958) work on the 
"uses of argument," which helped to set the scene for the subsequent shift from 
the study of the rational logic of science to the study of the reasonable modes of 
argumentation in science, and along another line to Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1959/1969), who are frequently credited with reviving interest in rhetor-
ic and its applications. Kuhn's (1970) work must also be cited as an important 
predecessor. Earlier predecessors, not directly influential on this shift, include 
Giambattista Vico (1744/1948; see Berlin, 1977; Mooney, 1985) and John 
Dewey. Dewey (1929/1960), following a line established by William James, 
argued for a distinction between old-fashioned "reason" and now-preferable 
"intelligence." According to this distinction, the strictly logical implementation 
of reason (in deducing necessary consequences of indubitable facts and assump-
tions) is associated with the old and unattainable ideal of achieving certain 
knowledge that exactly "mirrors" a presumably static world, whereas the in-
strumental use of intelligence (in making and continually revising contingent 
judgments) is associated (in Dewey's scheme) with an acceptance of the uncer-
tainty inherent in a world in which the practical activity of coming-to-know 
helps to shape the reality-that-is-known. (For the essays of a contemporary 
Deweyan, see Rorty, 1982.) Like Toulmin, Dewey (1929/1960) used the practic-
ing physician as the model of knowledge-in-action: The physician "draws upon 
a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at command. Without 
this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to 
reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain Jaws of physiology and patholo-
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gy, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements 
as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it 
is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities" (p. 207). 
This shift of focus from rationality to reasonableness, from logic to argu-
mentation, from the suppression to the recognition of the role and importance 
of rhetoric and practice reflects a "revolution" from theoretical ways of know-
ing to practical ways of understanding. Despite the fact that his own work 
preceded the recent shift by more than two centuries, Vico's emphasis on 
practical wisdom - on sapientia or prudentia rather than scientia - is a useful 
emblem of this "turn," especially insofar as this recent shift toward "postration-
al reasonableness" (as Pepper, 1942, christened it from afar) has raised long-
overlooked issues regarding the value dimensions and practical import of know-
ledge and science. (For a related discussion of the "recovery" of practical 
concerns in philosophy, see Toulmin, 1988.) 
Recent works on the rhetoric of science include Benjamin, Cantor, and 
Christie (1987), Knorr-Cetina (1981, chaps. 5 and 6), Leary (1987), McCloskey 
(1985), Nelson and Megill (1986), Nelson, Megill; and McCloskey (1987), 
Overington (1977), Schuster and Yeo (1986), Simons (1989), Weimer (1977, 
1979), and Yearley (1981). For some reason, anthropologists have been particu-
larly sensitive to the rhetorical dimension of their discipline. Clifford and 
Marcus (1986), Geertz (1988), Landau (1984), and Payne (1981) are but a few 
of many examples. On the relationship between rhetoric and moral action, see 
Jonsen and Toulmin (1988). Of the many works and developments in contem-
porary psychology that are consonant with the new interest in rhetoric, see 
Billig (1987), Bronfenbrenner, Kessel, Kessen, and White (1986), Bruner 
(1986), Gergen (1985), Gergen and Gergen (1983), Harre (1980), Kessen 
(1979), Polkinghorne (1988), Sarbin (1986), Scarr (1985), Schank and Abelson 
(1977), and Spence (1982). Brinton (1982) has addressed the relationship be-
tween William James's thought and the "epistemic view of rhetoric." 
I have discussed the responsiveness of psychologists to their audience else-
where (Leary, 1987). An additional illustration is provided by William James's 
statement: "I have found by experience that what my hearers seem least to 
relish is analytical technicality, and what they care for is concrete practical 
. application. So I have gradually weeded out the former, and left the latter 
unreduced .... In taking my cue from what has seemed to me to be the feeling 
of the audiences, I believe that I am shaping my books so as to satisfy the more 
genuine public need" (quoted in Vidich & Lyman, 1985, p. 68). Compare this 
statement with the definition of rhetoric at the beginning of this note. 
6 Contrary to frequent denials, such as Clark Hull's (1943) strenuous (and ironic) 
argument against argumentation in science (pp. 7-9), science obviously does 
aim to persuade. Despite his own "mechanomorphic" metaphors (e.g., pp. 
27-8), Hull, like so many other scientists, suffered from "tropophobia" as well 
as "rhetorophobia." (The poet Donald Hall, 1985, defined "tropophobia" as 
the "fear and loathing of metaphors.") However acute and misplaced, Hull's 
concern about rhetoric in science was not completely without cause. There are, 
in fact, a variety of ways of arguing and trying to persuade, and surely many 
types of discourse have less precise and less exacting standards and procedures 
than does science. Still, argument or persuasion is nonetheless what the scien-
tific process aims toward. Even Rudolf Carnap, the premier logical empiricist 
philosopher of science, had no problem accepting this: He began his classic 
work on The Logical Structure of the World (1928/1967) with an unapologetic 
acknowledgment that the purpose of a scientific work is "to persuade the reader 
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of the validity of the thoughts which it presents" (p. xv). To clarify the forms 
and means of scientific persuasion is what the rhetoric of science is all about. 
7 As mentioned in my earlier chapter, one of the issues worthy of further study is 
the following: What might be gained by making finer discriminations between 
metaphor and other figures of speech and thought in the analysis of the ways in 
which such figures have constituted, supported, and influenced psychological 
theory and practice? It would also be useful to pursue more detailed analyses of 
the different functions that metaphors can and have performed in the history of 
psychology. To name only a few of these functions, some of which have been 
noted in the preceding chapters, metaphors can be descriptive or explanatory, 
illustrative or constitutive, informative or evaluative, revealing or masking, 
enriching or deforming. This list of functions should not be taken as even 
approximately definitive, nor should the or in these pairings be taken as 
indicative of categorical or absolute distinctions. Seemingly "descriptive" or 
"illustrative" metaphors, for instance, need not be simply (i.e., neutrally or 
passively) "communicative" - they may actually help to constitute the "object" 
or "event" to which they refer and/or imply (i.e., tilt the balance toward) a 
certain type of explanation or a particular form of practical intervention. 
Nineteenth-century analyses of the "irrational mob" and twentieth-century 
discussions of "hyperactivity" may serve as examples. 
Other important issues for future study revolve around the classic "Kantian," 
"Peircean," and "Jamesian" questions: How is metaphor possible at all? What 
makes a particular metaphor more apt - and more probable to occur - in any 
given context? And how are the multiple dimensions of rationality, including 
the aesthetic, moral, and practical as well as intellectual dimensions, brought 
to bear on the assessment of the truthfulness of metaphors? How metaphor 
works, the nature of the constraints delimiting its operation, and the entire set 
of issues related to the nature and attribution of "truth" are all relevant to 
future inquiry along the lines established in this volume. Fortunately, contem-
porary researchers from many disciplines - from linguistics, psychology, and 
philosophy, among others - are advancing our understanding of these matters 
and thus preparing the way for a fuller understanding of the role of metaphor in 
the history of psychology. 
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